Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). suggested that “the question in every case is whether the words used are in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent,” according to Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. The First Amendment, the Court argued, did not protect speech encouraging insubordination, since, “when a nation is at war many things that might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as men fight, and that no Court could regard them as protected by any constitutional right.” In other words, the court argued, the circumstances of wartime permit greater restrictions on free speech than would be allowable during peacetime. This case was later weakened by Whitney v. California (1927) and by Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969), which replaced the “clear and present danger” test with the “imminent lawless action” test.

New York Times Company v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), The New York Times had published an advertisement indicating that officials in Montgomery, Ala. had acted violently in suppressing the protests of African-Americans during the Civil Rights Movement. The Montgomery Police Commissioner, L. B. Sullivan, sued the Times for libel on the grounds that the advertisement damaged his reputation. The Supreme Court unanimously overruled the $500,000 judgment against the Times. Justice William J. Brennan suggested that public officials may sue for libel only if the publisher published the statements in question with “actual malice,” a difficult standard to meet. Further tests of this case resulted in stricter standards such as that a statement must be provably false (falsifiable) before it can be the subject of a libel suit and that opinions cannot be considered defamatory.

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) was a United States Supreme Court decision that extended the Fourth Amendment protection from unreasonable searches and seizures to protect individuals in a telephone booth from wiretaps by authorities without a warrant. This case effectively overturned another case and it, and subsequent cases defined the “right to privacy,” a “right” previously undefined. Cases have defined four forms: (1) misappropriation of someone’s name or likeness for a commercial purpose; (2) public disclosure of private facts; (3) unreasonable intrusion upon seclusion; and (4) false light in the public eye. The courts have repeatedly held that no case of privacy can be made if the information is newsworthy or of legitimate concern.

Time Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967) established that actual malice was necessary for libel. Time’s liability was contingent upon a showing that it knowingly and recklessly published false statements about the Hill family. The Court explained that absent a finding of such malicious intent on the part of a publisher, press statements are protected under the First Amendment even if they are otherwise false or inaccurate.

Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969) was a United States Supreme Court case that resulted in a decision defining the constitutional rights of students in U.S. public schools. It is considered one of the Court’s more controversial decisions of the 1960s regarding freedom of speech. The Tinker test is still used by courts today to determine whether or not a school’s disciplinary actions violate students’ First Amendment rights.

New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) made it possible for the New York Times and Washington Post newspapers to publish the then-classified Pentagon Papers without risk of government censure. The Times case featured a constitutional crisis in which U.S. President Richard Nixon had claimed executive authority to force the prominent newspaper to suspend publication of classified information in its possession. The question before the court was if the constitutional freedom of the press under the First Amendment was subordinate to a claimed need by the president to maintain the secrecy of information. The Supreme Court ruled that the First Amendment did protect the New York Times’ right to print said materials. As a result of this pivotal case, the people of the United States were exposed to a history of inner operations of the executive with regards to the war, putting the Government under a level of public scrutiny it had not known before. The Times’ victory strengthened the notion that it was not only the right of but also a central purpose of the free press to scrutinize government.

Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974)[1], was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States established the standard of First Amendment protection against defamation claims brought by private individuals. The Court held that, so long as they do not impose liability without fault, states are free to establish their own standards of liability for defamatory statements made about private individuals. However, the Court also ruled that if the state standard is lower than actual malice, the standard applying to public figures, then only actual damages may be awarded.

Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo (1974) struck down a state law requiring newspapers criticizing political candidates to publish their responses. Appellee brought suit in Florida Circuit Court seeking injunctive and declaratory relief and damages, based on Florida’s “right of reply” statute that grants a political candidate a right to equal space to answer criticism and attacks on his record by a newspaper, and making it a misdemeanor for the newspaper to fail to comply. Even if a newspaper would face no additional costs to comply with the statute and would not be forced to forgo publication of news or opinion by the inclusion of a reply, the statute still fails to clear the First Amendment’s barriers because of its intrusion into the function of editors in choosing what material goes into a newspaper and in deciding on the size and content of the paper and the treatment of public issues and officials.

Hazelwood School District et al. v. Kuhlmeier et al., 484 U.S. 260 (1987) was a United States Supreme Court decision that held that public school curricular student newspapers that have not been established as forums for student expression are subject to a lower level of First Amendment protection than independent student expression or newspapers established (by policy or practice) as forums for student expression. It was decided on January 13, 1988 in favor of Hazelwood School District, overruling a Court of Appeals reversal of a District Court ruling.

Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989), was a decision by the Supreme Court of the United States that invalidated prohibitions on desecrating the American flag in force in 48 of the 50 states. Justice William Brennan wrote for a five-justice majority in holding that the defendant’s act of flag burning was protected speech under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. asserted that “if there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea offensive or disagreeable.”

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit decided, in Hosty v. Carter, 412 F.3d 731 (7th Cir. 2005) (en banc) that the Supreme Court’s rationale in Hazelwood is applicable to colleges in the Seventh Circuit (i.e., colleges in Indiana, Illinois, and Wisconsin). This means that students at colleges in those states will need to prove their publications have been opened as a forum for student expression to be entitled to full First Amendment protection. The decision has no impact outside of the Seventh Circuit, and other federal circuits have decided cases in direct opposition to the result in Hosty.